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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
HARRY W. KIRCHGESTNER,

Respondent,

vs.
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY,
a corporation,

Case
No. 7370

Appellant:

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The parties will be designated as they appeared in the
trial court. The record pages referred to are stenciled in
the lower right-hand corner of the page. The action in which
the appeal is taken was brought to recover damages for
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personal injuries and was predicated upon a violation of
the Federal Employer's Act (Title 45, Section 51, Et. Seq.
U. 8. C. A.) and also upon the Safety Appliance Act (Title
45, Section 4, U. S. C. A.). ·The trial court submitted to
the jury only the issues arising under the Safety Appliance
Act.
STATE:MEN'T OF FACTS
The plaintiff was awarded ·a verdict in the amount of
Four Thousand Three Hundred Dollars ($4,300.00), upon
which the judgment appealed from was entered in the Third
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County. At the time
of the accident and injuries complained of, plaintiff was
employed by the defendant as a brakeman on its Narrow
Gauge Railroad extending from Salida to Monarch in
Colorado. He alleged and testified that the grab iron on
the side of an ore car gave way as he grasped it in mounting
the car then in motion. According to his testimony, he
fell from the car and rolled down the mountain about twentyfive feet, striking his back against a large boulder (R. 100•
101). Although the train was moving at a rate of speed
of two miles per hour (R. 102) and the car from which he
claims to have fallen was next to the engine, plaintiff was
able to ascend the mountain and recover a position on the
engine (R. 135). Throughout this dramatic accident, plaintiff never relaxed his grasp on the detached grab-iron. The
alleged accident occurred about 8:30 P. M., June 26, 1948.
Plaintiff continued to perform his duties as a brakeman
until the train returned to Salida and his shift ended about
11:00 P. M. (R. 141-142). Immediately thereafter the
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plaintiff contacted a Mr. Bennett, the local representative
at Salida of the labor union to which plaintiff belonged
and was advised by Bennett that he had a good lawsuit
against the railroad (R. 137). Within a day or two after
the accident, plaintiff went to the hospital at Salida,
Colorado, maintained by the employees of the defendant,
and consulted a Dr. Smith (R. 104). Plaintiff says that Dr.
Smith prescribed some pills for the nerves (R. 104). He
returned again to the hospital and some X-ray pictures
were taken of his back (R. 104). The X-rays are marked
Exhibits "3" and "4". On July 6th plaintiff went to Pueblo,
Colorado, and contacted Mr. Sayger, a claim agent of the
defendant (R. 107). He there negotiated a settlement of any
cause of action arising out of the alleged accident of June
26th, received from the defendant $135.00 and executed a
general release (R. 160). This release is "Exhibit "2". He
returned to work July 22nd and worked two days in that
month, (Exhibit "C"). He worked eight days in August,
eighteen days in September, four days in October and five
days in November (Exhibit "C"). He was discharged early
in December on account of reduction in force (R. 129).
This action was commenced October 16, 1948 (R. 6) and
prior to the plaintiff's discharge. He claims to have sustained
an injury to his back as a result of a fall from the train
(R. 1-5). He further claims that this back injury activated
and aggravated ~'a latent osteo-arthritic condition of the
back, hips, lumbar and sacroiliac joints" (R. 3).

:r3

ai1

At the conclusion of the evidence, the defendant interposed a motion for a directed verdict in its favor upon the
ground that the plaintiff had compromised and settled the
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cause of action sued upon and that the release precluded
the defendant from maintaining the action (R. 186-189).
The motion was denied ( R. 189) .
STATEMENT OF ERRORS RIELIED ON
1. The trial court erred in refusing to direct the jury
to return a verdict in favor of the defendant and against
the plaintiff of no cause of action (R. 186-189).

2. The trial court erred in refusing to give defendant's Requested Instruction No.2 as requested and in modifying said instruction by striking the words "clear and unequivocal evidence" and inserting in place thereof the words
"a preponderance of the evidence" (R. 34).
3. The trial court erred in instructing the jury as set
forth in Instruction No. 10 for the reason that it is not
within the issues raised by the pleadings and there is no
evidence to which it could be applied (R. 203).
4. The trial court erred in instructing the jury as
set forth in Instruction No. 8 because it permitted the jury
to assess damages for future suffering that might probably
be endured (R. 202-203).
5. The court erred in permitting the plaintiff to
testify to statements ma_de to him by Dr. Hines for the
reason that the statements were hearsay (R. 115).
6. The trial court erred in permitting the plaintiff
to testify to statements made to him by Mr. Merrill for the
reason that the same are hearsay (R. 106).
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7. The trial court erred in permitting the plaintiff
to testify concerning a release for the reason that the same
is a conclusion (R. 106~107).
ARGUMENT
1.

NO FACTS ARE ALLEGED OR ESTABLISHED
BY EVIDENCE THAT WOULD JUSTIFY AN
AVOIDANCE OF THE RELEASE (ERROR
No. 1).

For convenience we set forth below the exact language
of the release upon which the defendant relys, omitting the
heading and signatures :
''IN SOLE CONSIDERATION OF the payment
to me by THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY of the sum of
One Hundred Thirty-Five and No/100 Dollars
($135.00), receipt of which is hereby acknowledged,
I do hereby release and forever discharge said THE
DENVER AND RIO GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, from all claims and causes of
action which I now have or may hereafter have or
claim on account of any and all personal injuries,
whether now known or apparent or unknown or not
now apparent, including complications arising from
such personal injuries, or the treatment thereof,
for loss of services, and for loss of or damages to
property, growing out of or resulting from an accident which occurred at or near Monarch, State of
Colorado, on or about the 26th day of June, 1948,
while I was employed as Brakeman; and I ~ereby
acknowledge full payment, satisfaction and discharge
of any and all such claims or causes of action, and
fully understand that I can make no further claim
against said Railroad Company even though said
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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InJuries are more serious or different than I now
know or understand them to be.
"I agree that the above stated amount is the
sole and only consideration for this settlement and
that no promise or contract, either of employment
or of any other nature, on the part of said Railroad
Company has been made to me.
"I have read the foregoing release and fully
understand the same."
We also for convenience quote the plaintiff's reply,
seeking the avoidance of the release, omitting only formal
parts:
"Admits the truth of paragraph 2 of said
amended answer; in answer to paragraph 4 plaintiff alleges that the $135.00 which was paid to him
by the defendant on the 6th day of July, 1948, was
intended by both plaintiff and defendant to settle
only the claim which plaintiff had at that time
against the defendant for lost wages, suffered as a
result of his injury; that at the time of the signing
of the release, which defendant required plaintiff
to execute before defendant would pay plaintiff his
lost wages, plaintiff and defendant' both believed
that the plaintiff had not suffered any serious personal injury and that plaintiff had completely recovered from the effects of his fall from defendant's
train, which said fall is accurately and completely
described in plaintiff's complaint on file herein;
plaintiff further alleges that contrary to the beliefs
of plaintiff and defendant, plaintiff had suffered a
serious and crippling personal injury which became
evident to plaintiff soon after the signing of said
release and continues to the present time, which said
injury is described in plaintiff's complaint on file
herein.''
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"WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that he be
granted relief against defendant in accordance with
the prayer of his complaint on file herein."
We shall assume but not admit that the validity of a
release of a cause of action arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act or the Federal Safety Appliance Act
is controlled by the law as ·declared by the courts of the
United States. In Callen v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 332 U.S. 62·5, 68 S. Ct. 296, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that a release of a cause of action arising
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act stood upon the
same footing as a release of any other cause of action. There
is therefore no federal law peculiar to the release of a cause
of action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act to be
considered in this case.

It is the contention of the defendant that the plaintiff
.failed to either allege or produce any evidence of facts sufficient under federal law to warrant a jury or court to
nullify the release.
We have set forth above, the pleading under which the
plaintiff seeks to avoid the settlement and release of the
cause of action sued upon. It is to be noted at the outset
of an examination of the plaintiff's reply· that he admits by
failing to deny that he executed a written release which by
its terms discharged the cause of action sued upon. Accordingly no legal effect can be given to the allegation that
the $135.00 payment made to the plaintiff on the date of
the release was intended by both plaintiff and defendant to
settle only the claim which plaintiff had at that time against
the defendant for lost wages suffered as a result of his
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InJury. What the parties intended to accomplish by the payment must be ascertained solely from the language of the
written release. See: In re: Atwater, 296 F. 278, affirmed
254 U. S. 423, 41 S. Ct. 150, 65 L. Ed. 339; St. L. & S. F.
Ry. Co. v. Dearborn, 60 F. 880.
No claim is made by plaintiff in his reply that he was
induced to execute the release by any misrepresentation of
fact by the defendant or by any coercion or undue influence
exerted by the defendant or anyone else. In this state of the
pleadings the only inquiry left open is whether the allegations
in the reply set forth a mutual mistake of fact which would
justify a recission of the release. The allegations of mutual
mistake are simply that the parties believed that the plaintiff had not suffered any serious injury but had completely
recovered from the effects of the fall from the train, and
that contrary to this belief the plaintiff had suffered a
serious injury which later became manifest and continues
to the present time.
These allegations are insufficient as a foundation for
nullification of the release. They do not disclose any mutual
mistake of an existing or past fact. The only mutual mistake
of the parties alleged concerns their beliefs or opinions with
respect to the future consequences of the injury sustained
in the accident. This is not enough.
The leading case in the Federal Courts establishing the
conditions precedent to the right to avoid a release upon the
ground of mutual mistake of fact is Chicago & N. W. Ry.
Co. v. Wilcox, 116 Fed. 913. In that case Mrs. Wilcox
sustained a fractured femur as a result of a fall while
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riding as a passenger upon one of the defendant's trains.
She settled her claim for $600 and gave the1 railroad a
general release. The claim agent of the railroad who
effected the settlement informed the plaintiff that her
injuries were temporary and that she would recover from
them in about a year. She testified that she believed
the claim agent and relied upon his assurance in making
the settlement. It developed that her injuries were
permanent and in her action against the railroad she sought
to avoid her release upon the ground that it was predicated
upon a mutual mistake of fact. The court held that the release was binding. The question whether a general release
could be avoided upon the ground of the mutually mistaken
beliefs of the parties as to the future effect of a known
injury was answered in the negative. The court said:

.....

;/

"Again, it is not every mistake that will lay the
foundation for the rescission of an agreement. That
foundation can be biid only by a mistake of a past or
present fact material to the agreement. Such an
effect cannot be produced by a mistake in prophecy
or in opinion, or by a mistake in belief relative to an
uncertain future event. A mistake as to the future
unknowable effect of existing facts, a mistake as to
the future uncertain duration of a known condition,
or a mistake as to the future effect of a personal injury, cannot have this effect, because these future
happenings are not facts, and in the nature of things
are not capable of exact knowledge; and everyone
who contracts in reliance upon opinions or beliefs
concerning them knows that these opinions and beliefs are conjectural, and makes his agreement in
view of the well-known fact that they may turn out
to be mistaken, and assumes the chances that they
will do so. Hence, where parties have knowrngly and
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purposely made an agreement to compromise and
settle a doubtful claim, whose character and extent
are necessarily conditioned by future contingent
events, it is no ground for the avoidance of the contract that the events happen very differently from
the expectation, opinion, or belief of one or both of
the parties." (Citing numerous cases.)
There has been no departure by the federal courts from
the proposition announced in the above quotation from the
Wilcox case. There has been some criticism of the dictum
that a statement of a doctor to the effect that a patient
will fully recover in a certain time is not a statement
of a present fact. What was actually decided, however,
in the Wilcox case has been followed without dissent.
See Wilson v. Sands, 231 F. 921; McGovern v. McClintockMarshall Co., 269< F. 911; Denver & S. L. Ry. Co. v. Moffat
Tunnel Improvement Dist., 35 F. (2d) 365; United States
v. Golden, 34 F. (2d) 367; United States v. Garland, 122 F.
(2d) 118; Pacific llfutual Life Insurance Co. of California
v. Jacob, 87 F. (2d) 870.
The reply was fatally defective for the additional reason
that it contained no allegation that the release was predicated upon the alleged mistaken beliefs. It must be concluded from the omission of such an essential allegation
that the mistaken beliefs of the parties played no part in
the formation of the contract embodied in the release. In
other words, the release would have been executed and delivered had the parties known that their beliefs were erroneous. The authorities are agreed that a mutual mistake of
fact is without legal significance unless the contract would
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not have been entered into if the parties had known the true
facts.
As pointed out by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Grymes v. Saunders, 93 U. S. 55, 23 L. Ed. 798 :
"A mistake as to a matter of fact, to warrant
relief in equity, must be material, and the fact must
be such that it animated and controlled the conduct
of the party. It must go to the essence of the object
in view, and· not be merely incidental. The court
must be satisfied, that but for the mistake the complainant would not have assumed the obligation from
which he seeks to be relieved. Kerr on Mistake and
Fraud, 408; T1igg v. Read, 5 Humph. 529; Jennings
v. Broughton, 17 Beav. 541; Thompson v. Jackson,
3 Rand. 507; Harrod's Heirs v. Cowan, Hardin, 543;
Hill v. Hush, 19,Barb. (Ark.) 52.2; Jouzan v. Toulmin,
9 Ala. 662."

_.

The final and fatal defect in the reply lies in the failure
of the plaintiff to tender to the defendant the consideration
paid by it for the release.
Whether a party seeking to avoid the release of a cause
of action arising under a federal statute must tender the
consideration paid to him is to be determined by the decisions of the United States courts. See Ricketts v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 153 Fed. (2d) 757; Callen v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 332 U. S. 625, 68 S. Ct. 296. Under
federal law, tender of the consideration paid for a release is
a condition precedent to avoidance of the release.

is';

!{~

Collett v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 81 Fed. Supp. 428;
Grymes v. Sanders, 93. U. S. 55, 23 L. Ed. 798; Lyons v.
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Allen, 11 App. D. C. 543; Thornton v. Puget Sound Power
& Light Co., 49 Fed. (2d) 347.
In the Collett case the plaintiff sued the defendant under the Federal Employers' Liability Act to recover damages for personal injuries. The defendant pleaded in defense
a general release of the cause of action. The plaintiff obtained an order permitting him to reply to the answer. He
alleged in the reply that the release was obtained by fraud.
He omitted to allege any tender back of the consideration
paid for the release. The defendant moved to strike the
reply. The motion was granted upon the ground that the
reply failed to tender back the consideration for the release. The court said :
"Since the substantive and procedural rights
involved in an attack upon a contract of compromise
and release in an Employers' Liability case are governed by the same general principles that apply to
other contracts the general· principle which requires
the return of the fruits of the contract before it can
be attacked for fraud is applicable also. Vandervelden
v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., C. C., 61 F. 54; Patterson v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co., D. C., 5 F.
Supp. 595, and cases there cited."
In Thornton v. Puget Sound Power and Light Co., supra,
the plaintiff brought suit under the Merchant and Marine
Act to recover for the death of a seaman. The plaintiff also
sought to set aside a general release, upon the ground that
it had been obtained by fraud. No tender of the consideration paid was set forth in the complaint. The court held
that the complaint did not state a cause of action. Hill v.
N. P. Ry. Co., 113 Fed. 914; Price v. Conners, 146 Fed. 503;
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Mahr v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 170 Fed. 699; Miles v.
Lavender, 10 Fed. (2d) 450; the Thomas P. Beal, 298 Fed.
121, were cited and relied upon as establishing the proposition that federal law requires a tender of the consideration
paid as a condition precedent to the avoidance of a general
release. An examination of the cited cases will demonstrate
that they fully sustain the decision of the Thornton case.
Apart from the insufficiency of the pleadings, there
was an entire failure of proof of any facts that impair in
the least the validity of the release.
The circumstances surrounding the execution and delivery of the release are as related by the plaintiff that on
July 6th, following the alleged accident, he went to Pueblo
and contacted Mr. M. V. Sayger, a claim agent of the defendant (R. 180). He went in Mr. Sayger's office in the
depot and after introducing himself said: "Well, Mr. Sayger,
how about settling up with me?" "He said: (Well, let's
see what we can do" (R. 181) .) Mr. Sayger further said:
"Well, that would figure you about $125, wouldn't it? I
said: "I will take $135 and that was all there was to it" (R.
181).
What did he (Mr. Sayger) say?
He said, "You drive a hard bargain."
Q. Was anything else said?
A. No sir. He wrote me out a check. I went
and cashed it and went on to Denver.
Q. Was anything said concerning your going
back to work?
A. No, not that I recall. He asked me how I
felt. I said, "I feel like I could go back to work
again." And he said, "Okeh" (R. 181).
Q.

A.
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Plaintiff further testified that he believed he could go
back to work and felt that his injuries were over (R. 182).
Mr. Sayger testlfied that when plaintiff called at his
office in Pueblo he knew nothing about plaintiff's injuries
except that Dr. Fuller had reported to him that plaintiff
was physically qualified to return to work (R. 161-162). He
asked the plaintiff about his injuries and plaintiff said he
felt he was able to return to work but wanted to go to Denver
and then back to Salida where he would be ready to go to
work (R. 163). Over the objection of the defendant, counsel
for the plaintiff was permitted to ask the question: "And
at that time you agreed to pay him $13.50 a day for the
ten days," to which question Mr. Sayger replied: "I used
no formula to arrive at the amount of payment (R. 165).
He further stated that he had no discussion with the plaintiff as to how much a day should be allowed and no mention
was made of the sum of $13.50 per day in the course of the
conversation (R. 165).
Mr. Sayger didn't know anything about the plaintiff's
belief except that plaintiff told him he was ready to go to
work and wanted to settle his case (R. 167). Plaintiff remarked to Mr. Sayger that he had been contacted by one
Bennet~, a switchman at Salida, who had suggested to the
plaintiff that he claim a back injury and bring a lawsuit
against the railroad (R. 167).
The symptoms of any injury sustained by the plaintiff
in the alleged accident of June 26th are wholly subjective,
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except that Dr. White claims to have discovered a slight
muscle spasm in the lower region of the back. There was
no evidence of any bruise, abrasion, or other trauma. The
record is silent concerning any torn or disheveled clothing.
X-rays of the plaintiff's back, taken at Salida within two or
three days after the alleged accident and those taken about
the time the action was commenced, revealed no pathology
that was in any way connected with the asserted fall from
the train. He received no medical treatment except that Dr.
Smith at the Salida Hospital recommended some pills for
his nerves (R. 124).

~·

•,

Plaintiff admitted that he completed his shift, which
required several hours of switching work, following the alleged accident. He testified that he worked some following
the accident and prior to the date of the settlement. He
worked two full days on July 22nd and July 23rd and eigpt
full days between August 1st and 15th, inclusive. He
worked eighteen days in September, earning more in that
month than in any previous month of his employment by the
defendant. He worked four days in October and five days
in November. He was cut off the board in December be-·
cause of reduction in force. He admitted that the only
reason he didn't earn more money between the date of the
alleged accident and the date his employment terminated
was that his seniority was so low that no work was available
to him (R. 129).
Whether the plaintiff actually worked any time between
the date of the alleged accident and the date of settlement
as admitted by him is not of controlling importance. It is
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certain, however, that he· was not working on July 2nd
because he was then in jail on a charge of drunkenness and
indecent exposure (R. 130).
It is submitted that the evidence is entirely insufficient

to support a finding that the general release rests upon a
mutual mistake of fact which would render it invalid.
It is legally impossible to find in these circumstances,
under which the release was executed, any evidence whatever that it was motivated by a mutual mistake of the
parties with respect to any fact, past, future or present.
There is no indication that at the time the release was executed he had sustained any personal injury of which he
was not then aware. Nor is there any evidence of any subsequent aggrevation or unexpected developments of the injuries, if any, growing out of the alleged accident. Plaintiff
believed at the time he signed the release "* * * Like I
could go back to work again." As to this belief, it was
conclusively established to be correct. He not only was
able to go back to work again, but was able to earn more
money in a month than he had ever earned during his employment by the defendant. Not only did he return to work,
but he returned as soon as work was available. He continued
to work so long as it was available (R. 129).
He had not been advised by any physician that he was
or was not able to return to work, nor was he acting under
the influence of the opinion or advice of any physician or
surgeon. There is no proof of any change in his condition
prior to the release and subsequent thereto. He stated that
· the pain in his back continued from the time of the alleged
accident up to the time of trial (R. 129).
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With respect to the defendant, it had no knowledge
concerning the plaintiff's condition except that both the
plaintiff and his doctor believed that he was able to return
to work, a belief heretofore shown to be well founded.
There is a complete absence of any fraud, erroneous
representation, coercion or overreaching in the negotiations
leading up to the settlement. Plaintiff sought out the defendant's claim agent in a distant city and requested a settlement of his claim. He demanded and received more money
than the claim agent had offered. He read the release and
understood its terms. Neither he nor the claim agent was
under the least misapprehension concerning the nature,
character or extent of any injury sustained by the plaintiff
in the alleged accident. They were not even mistaken about
any future development of any injury sustained by the
plaintiff. The federal cases are clear that the release executed by the plaintiff is a valid and binding settlement of
the cause of action sued upon. See Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co.
v. Wilcox, 116 F. 913; Grymes v. Sanders, 93 U. S. 55, 23
L. Ed. 798; Merwin v. N.Y., N.H. & H. R., 62 F. (2d) 803;
Rader v. Lehigh Valley Railway Co., 26 F. (2d) 73~; Sitchon
v. American Export Lines, Inc., 113 F. (2d) 830.

.-

~

.....

·.

a;

Even if it be assumed contrary to the evidence that the
parties were mutually mistaken with respect to the nature
and extent of the plaintiff'f:! injuries, such mistake would
avail the plaintiff nothing because it is, as a matter of law,
immaterial and played no part in the formation of the contract embodied in the release. It will be noted that the
release discharges all claims and causes of action which the
plaintiff then had or that he might thereafter have or claim
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to have on account of any and all personal injuries whether
then known or apparent or unknown or not apparent, including complications arising from such personal injuries
or the treatment thereof. By these statements in the release
the parties declared emphatically that it was immaterial to
them in arriving at a settlement whether they were or might
be mistaken with respect to the nature or extent of the
plaintiff's injuries. The very basis of the contract is an
assumption that the parties may be wholly mistaken as to
both the nature and the duration of the plaintiff's injuries
The probability that the injuries might be greater or their
duration longer than the parties then realized or expected
was the very contingency that motivated the release. The
plaintiff voluntarily and expressly assumed the risk of such
a contingency. In view of the express written terms of the
release, any mistakes of the parties with respect to the nature
or extent of plaintiff's injuries were not material and did
not induce the contract or form any basis for entering into it.
In Sitchon v. American Export Lines, Inc., 113 Fed. (2d
Series) 830, a seaman brought suit under the Jones Act
to recover damages for ·personal injuries. He had previously,
in consideration of the sum of $180.00, executed and delivered to the defendant a general release covering any and
all injuries and/ or illness sustained on or about the date
of the accident and reciting that plaintiff took the risk that
he might then or in the future have other injuries, illness
or disabilities that he did not then know of. In the accident
involved in the case, the plaintiff was struck on the head by
a piece of machinery. Both the plaintiff and the defendant
had been informed by the doctors, after careful and thorough
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examination of the plaintiff, that plaintiff's injuries were
temporary and consisted of only a slight concussion. After
the release had been executed it was discovered that the
plaintiff had received a fra~ture of the skull in the accident
and that the fracture was certain to result in permanent
disability. It was admitted that both the plaintiff and the
defendant were grievously mistaken as to both the nature
and the extent of the plaintiff's ·injuries. The court held
that the release was valid and not subject to attack upon
the ground of the mutual mistake of fact concerning the
nature qr extent of the plaintiff's injuries. The court said:
"The release here contemplated a settlement of
claims for all present and future damages arising
out of the accident. The settlement does not bear
the slightest taint of fraud and if there was a mistake as to the nature or extent of the injuries, and
the judge in the court below seems to have thought
there was none, the release accompanying the settlement fairly arrived at was a bar to the plaintiff's
action. Bonici v. Standard Oil Co., 2 Cir., 103 F.
2d 437; Harmon v. United States, .5 Cir., 59 F. 2d
372; Spangler v. Kartzmark, 121 N. J. Eq. 64, 187
A. 770; Cogswell v. Railroad, 78 N. H. 379, 101 A.
145.
"The law of New Jersey is apparently in accord
with the result we have reached, though that fact
is really unimportant where the question is one affecting the rights of a seaman under the maritime
law. That question is one which the United States
courts have to answer."

~:

p;.

~orll

The proposition announced in the Sitchon case to the
effect that where the release covers both known and unknown injuries and complications from known injuries, it
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is immaterial that the parties may have been mutually mistaken with respect to the character or duration of the plaintiff's injuries, is settled of law in the federal courts. See
Lumley v. Wabash Railway Co., 76 Fed. 66; Haddock v.
N01·th Atlantic and GulfS. S. Co., 81 Fed. Supp. 421; Chicago
& N. Y. Railway Co.

v. Wilcox, supra.

II. TO AVOID A RELEASE, PLAINTIFF MUST
PROVE MUTUAL MISTAKE BY CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE (ERROR No. 2).
The defendant in its request numbered 2 asked that the
jury be instructed that the burden rested upon the plaintiff to prove by clear and unequivocal evidence that the release was executed under the mutual mistake of the parties
with respect to the recovery of the plaintiff. The court,
however, modified the request by instructing that the burden
rested upon the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence the alleged mistake of fact.
So far as we can determine, the law of every jurisdiction in this country requires a party seeking to avoid a release upon the ground that it was founded upon a mutual
mistake of fact to prove the claimed mistake of fact by clear
and unequivocal evidence. Certainly this the law of the
federal courts. See Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Wilcox,
116 F. 913; Callen v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 16·2' F.
(2d) 832~; Merwin v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 62 F.
(2d) 803.

By modifying the defendant's request the court relieved
the plaintiff of practically the entire burden which he was
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required to carry in order to avoid the release. The cases
above cited demonstrate that it was prejudicial error to relieve the defendant of this burden.
III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY
THAT PLAINTIFF COULD RECOVER FOR AN
AGGRAVATION OF HIS PRIE - EXISTING
PHYSICAL CONDITION (ERROR No. 3.).
In Instruction No. 10 the court said :
"·Plaintiff is entitled to recover full compensation for all damages proximately resulting from the
defective grab-iron, if any, even though his injuries
may have been aggravated by reason of his preexisting physical condition, or rendered more difficult to cure by reason of his state of health or even
though by reason of a latent disease the injuries were
rendered more serious to him that they would have
been had he been in the best of health.
"In this connection you are instructed that if
you find that the plaintiff is entitled under these instructions to recover damages, then plaintiff is entitled to full compensation for all damages proximately resulting from said defective grab-iron, if
any, even though his injuries are more serious and
of longer duration than they would have otherwise
been because of any arthritic condition from which
plaintiff may have been suffering."

·=

'·' (

The vice of this instruction lies in the absence of any
evidence to which it could be applied by the jury.

t~:

There was evidence of an old osteo-arthritis involving
the back bone, also a hernia and an injury to one of plain-

h~'
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tiff's legs. However, there is no evidence that any injury
sustained on June 26th was aggravated by any of these
previous conditions or rendered more difficult to cure. The
medical testimony with respect to pre-existing disease or
conditions and the connection between them and the alleged fall from the train was given by Doctors White and
Fuller. Neither of these doctors expressed the opinion that
there was any connection between the pre-existing diseases
and the injury complained of in this action. Doctor White
explained that the only evidence of injury to the plaintiff
traceable to a fall from a train was a muscle injury which
was manifest by a spasm. He considered that the site of
this claimed muscle injury was too remote from the site of
the osteo-arthritis for that injury to be affected by the
disease (R. 79-80). The most that Doctor Fuller would say
was that there was a possibility of a connection between
the assumed injury to the muscle and to the osteo-arthritic
condition (R. 177-178).
There is, of course, no pretense of any connection between the old leg injury or the hernia and anything which
occurred to the plaintiff on June 26th.
Nor does the testimony of the plaintiff afford any basis
for connecting his claimed injuries with the pre-existing
disease or condition. All of the pain, of course, originated
on June 26th. He located the source of the pain at the poin1
where Dr. White claims to have discovered a muscle spasm
Plaintiff nowhere claimed that his injuries of June 26tl
were in any manner aggravated or prolonged by his disease
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In this state of the evidence, there was none to which
Instruction No. 10 could have any application. That an instruction to a jury upon a subject concerning which there
is no evidence is erroneous is elementary. That the error
was prejudicial in this case is patent. There was a sharp
conflict in the evidence as to whether the plaintiff sustained
any injury whatsoever at the time or place claimed by him.
His admitted activities since the alleged accident and the
medical testimony produced by the defendant fully authorize it to contend that the plaintiff was a malingerer. To
direct the jury as the court did in Instruction No. 10,
to award the plaintiff full compensation not only for the
injuries sustained in the claimed accident but also for additional injuries of which there is no evidence, rendered
it impossible for the defendant to obtain from the jury
a just verdict. The following authorities unanimously
condemn Instruction No. 10 and establish its prejudicial
character:

Tyng v. Constant Lorraine Investment Co., 37
Utah 304, 108 P. 1109; State Bank of Beaver County v. Hollingshead, 82 Utah 416, 25 P. (2d) 612;
Railroad Company v. Houston, 95 U. S. 697; Erie
Railroad Co. v. Vajo, 41 F. (2d) 738.
In the Houston case the Supreme Court of the United
States said :
"To instruct a jury upon assumed facts to which
no evidence applied was error. Such instructions
tended to mislead them, by withdrawing their attention from the proper points involved in the issue.
Juries are sufficiently prone to indulge in conjectures, without having possible facts not in evidence
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suggested for their consideration. In no respect could
the instructions mentioned have aided them in reaching a just con~lusion."
Furthermore, the instruction was not within any issue
raised by the pleadings. There is no allegation in the complaint or elsewhere that any injuries arising from the alleged
fall have been aggravated by reason of plaintiff's pre-existing physical condition, or that such injuries were rendered
more difficult to cure by reason of his state of health. Nor
was any claim made that the injuries of June 26th were
rendered more serious because of the plaintiff's lack of good
health. On the contrary, the allegation of the plaintiff was
I
that the injuries of June 26th ,had aggravated the latent
osteo-arthritic condition. In other words, the instruction
related to a subject exactly opposite to the subject in issue
under the pleadings. The above authorities are equally clear
to the proposition that it is prejudicial error to instruct upon
subject not within the issues raised by the pleadings.

IV. THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY THAT
PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION FOR ALL PAIN AND SUFFERING THAT
HE WILL PROBABLY ENDURE IN THE
FUTURE (ERROR No. 4).
In Instruction No. 8 the court instructed the jury in
part as follows :
"In determining the amount of such damages
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pensation for all pain and suffering, if any, both
mental and physical, which he has endured since the
time he sustained his injuries and that he will probably endure in the future * * * It is left to the
sound judgment and discretion of the jury trying
the case to determine from a preponderance of the
evidence what amount is reasonable compensation to
award plaintiff for the physical or mental pain and
suffering which he has endured or will probably endure in the future."
This instruction authorized recovery for future pain
an~ suffering, regardless of the uncertainty of their' ever
being endured. If the jury considered there was a mer~
probability of future pain and suffering, they were required_
to make an award. Such is not the measure of damage for
future pain or suffering. The plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for only such future pain and suffering as
the evidence establishes with reasonable certainty will be
endured. In Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Lindeman,
143 Fed. 946, the court held that an instruction similar to
the one given in the instant case constituted reversible error.
The court said :
"Another specification of error is that the court
instructed the jury that the plaintiff was entitled
to recover for such pain and suffering caused by the
injury as he 'may in the future suffer.' In Chicago
& N. Y. Ry. Co. v. De Clow, 124 Fed. 142, 143, 145,
61 C. C. A. 34, 35, 37, in which this court had occasion to consider the rule applicable to this question, it said:"
" 'The liability for future damages for the
wrongful infliction of a personal injury is strictly
limited to compensation for such suffering and other
evil effects of the act as are reasonably certain to
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result from it. Possible, even probable, future damages are too remote and speculative to form the
basis of legal injury. If they may or subsequently do
result from the accident, they are but a part of that
damnum absque injuria which reaches too far into
the realm of conjecture to form any part of the basis
of an action at law. Filer v. N.Y. Central R. R. Co.,
49 N. Y. 42, 45; Curtis v. R. & S. R. R. Co., 18 N. Y.
534, 542, 75 Am. Dec. 258; Fry v. Railway Co., 45
Iowa, 416, 417; White v. Milwaukee 'City Ry. Co., 61
Wis. 536, 541, 21 N. W. 524, 50 Am. Rep. 154; Block
v. Milwaukee St. R. Co., 89 Wis. 371, 380, 61 N. W.
1101, 27 L. R. A. 365, 46 Am. St. Rep. 849; Smith v.
Milwaukee Builders' & Traders' Exchange, 91 Wis.
360, 368, 64 N. W. 1041, 30 L. R. A. 504, 51 Am. St.
Rep. 912; Ford v. City of Des Moines, 106 Iowa, 94,
97, 75 N. W. 630; Chicago, R. I. & Pac. R. Co. v.
McDowell (Neb.) 92 N. W. 121'."
See also: Southwest Brewery Co. v. Schmidt, 226 U. S.
163 - - S. Ct. - - ; Daigneau v. Grand Trunk Railway Co.,
153 Fed. 593; Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U. S. 22, 9 S. Ct. 696.
V. THE COURT GOMMIT'T'ED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN PER1\1ITTING THE PLAINTIFF TO
'T'ESTIFY TO TREA'T'MENT PRESCRIBED BY
DOCTOR HINES (ERROR No.5).
Plaintiff testified that following the settlement made
through Mr. Sayger, he went to Denver and consulted Dr.
Hines. Over the objection of the defendant to any statements
made to the plaintiff by Dr. Hines, the plaintiff testified :
Q.

A.

What did he prescribe?
He told me to go down and get some kind

* * *
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What did he prescribe for you?
Prescribed a belt for me.
Q. Any particular kind of belt?
A. No, he didn't say. He just said: "Go get
a belt for your back" (R. 115).
Q.

A.

There is no evidence that Dr. Hines was an agent of,
or had any authority whatever to represent the defendant
at the time the plaintiff consulted him. Plaintiff does not
say that anyone connected with the defendant sent him to
Dr. Hines or even knew that he had gone to the doctor's
office. It follows that any statements made by Dr. Hines to
the plaintiff or any treatment prescribed by the doctor were
hearsay as to the defendant, and inadmissible in evidence
in this action. It is so held in United States v. McCreary,
105 F. (2d) 297. See also Bucher v. Equitable Life Assur.
Soc. of the United States, 91 Utah 179, 63 P. (2d) 604.

-·'··

VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING
PLAINTIFF TO TESTIFY TO HiEARSAY
STATEMENTS MADE TO HIM BY MR. MERRILL, AND TO PLAINTIFF'S CONCLUSIONS
CONCERNING HIS CONDITION (ERROR
Nos. 6 and 7).
Plaintiff stated that after seeing Dr. Hoover at the
employeee' hospital in Salida, he went to his home in Denver.
The following then occurred (R. 106-107) :

~:

"Q. How did you happen to leave Salida for
Denver?
MR. BAGLEY: I object to it as calling for a
conclusion of the witness, and immaterial.
Q. Were you released from duty?
A. From the Salida Board, yes.
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Who released you?
A. The trainmaster's clerk, by the name of Mr.
Merrill.
Q. Was that because of your physical condition?
MR. BAGLEY': I object to that, your Honor, as
calling for a conclusion of the witness, and incompetent.
MR. KING: He knows why he was released.
THE COURT: Objection overruled.
Q. Were you released because of your physical
condition?
A. Yes.
MR. BAGLEY: Just a moment, your Honor.
I move to strike that answer on the ground it is a
conclusion of the witness, hearsay, and incompetent.
THE COURT: Of course, it might be a conclusion.
MR. KING: He knows.
Q. (By Mr. King) Do you know why you were
released, Mr. Kirchgestner?
A. Certainly.
MR. BAGLEY: I make the same objection.
MR. KING: It isn't a matter of opinion.
THE COURT: He can state what happened.
Q. (By Mr. King) Tell us just exactly what
happened concerning your leaving Salida, Colorado?
A. Mr. Merrill released me fromMR. BAGLEY: I move to strike that answer as
a conclusion, and hearsay.
MR. KING: A statement of fact.
THE COURT: Don't make the conclusion as to
what happened. State what happened. You went to
Mr. Merrill, or he came to you, and what happened?
A. Sent me to Pueblo, down there to see the
claim agent, Sayger.
MR. BAGLEY: I move to strike that answer
upon the ground that it is hearsay and incompetent.
Q.
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THE COURT: Objection overruled and the motion to strike is denied.
Q. About what day of the month was it, Mr.
Merrill sent you down to see Mr. Sayger?
A. I believe it was June 25th or 6th."
There is a complete absence of any evidence that Merrill had any authority whatsoever to bind the defendant or
represent the defendant in the matter of releasing any employee of the defendant from the Salida board. There is not
even any competent evidence that Merrill was an employee
or had any contractual connection with the defendant whatsoever. It is clear therefore that any statement made by
Merrill to the plaintiff was not binding upon the defendant.

:;.

:;.:

That it was prejudicial error to admit these hearsay
statements is established by State Bank of Beaver County
v. Hollingshead, 82 Utah 416, 25 P. (2d) 612, and S. W.
Bridges & Co. v. Candland, 88 Utah 373, 54 P. (2d) 842.
The statement of the plaintiff as to why he was released
from the Salida board, if construed as reasons given by
Merrill, is of course hearsay and inadmissable under the
cases cited. If construed as a statement of plaintiff's reasons, it is either a conclusion or a self-serving statement.
Under either interpretation it was inadmissible in evidence.

VII. SUMMARY.
In conclusion, we respectfully submit that the reply of
t: the plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to invalidate
'1-: the general release in that there was no allegation of a
0
mutual mistake of an existing or past fact or that any mutual
-: mistake of the parties was the inducement or foundation of
ff"~ ~·

........
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the release; that the reply was insufficient for the further
reason that the plaintiff did not tender or allege that he
had offered to return the consideration paid for the release;
that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a finding that
the release was founded upon or induced by a mutual mistake of the parties with respect to either the nature, character or extent of the plaintiff's injuries; that as a matter of
law any mutual mistake of the parties with respect to the
nature, extent or duration of the plaintiff's injuries was
immaterial and was not an inducement to, or the basis of,
the release; that for the foregoing reasons the trial court
erred in denyi.ng the defendant's motion for a peremptory
instruction to the jury in its favor.
Should the foregoing conclusions be rejected, the defendant would respectfully submit that the court committed
prejudicial error in its instructions to the jury and in admitting incompetent evidence over the objections of the
defendant.
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed with
directions to dismiss the action.

Respectfully submitted,

VAN COT'T,
BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY,
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON,
Attorneys for Appellants.
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